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IN THE SUPRE!'JE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONALD J. RICHARDSON, GROVEL.
COOK and v<AYNE WEAVER, individually and for and on behalf
of all similarly situated shareholders of Major Oil Corporation,

REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
ARIZONA FUELS CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, EUGENE DALTON,
an individual, DEANNA B. DALTON,
an individual and ~1AJOR OIL
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

No. 15691

Defendants and Appellants

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Defendants-Appellants Arizona Fuels Corporation,

Eugene Dalton,

Corporation

Deanna B.

(herein "defendants")

Dalton and

~iajor

Oil

respectfully object to

Plaintiff-Respondents (herein "plaintiffs") Brief in that
it

substantially

misstates

the

facts,

issue and, hence, misinterprets the law.
will

address

itself

exclusively

misconstrues

the

This Reply Brief

to the most apparent of

tnese misunderstandings.
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ARGUMENT
I.

BARE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS VERIFIED ON INFORMATION
AND BELIEF ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER.
Defendants submit, although perhaps misunderstood by plaintiffs,

that a small dissatisfied

minority cannot wrench control from the majority of a
corporation based solely upon speculative and unfounded
allegations and legal conclusions of misconduct.

The law

remains clear that a receiver can only be appointed based
on admissible evidence; allegations in a verified complaint made only upon information and belief clearly are
not such evidence.
Kan.

State ex. rel Fatzer vs Molitor, 175

317, 263 P.2d 207

(1953); 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia

Corporations, §7747; 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers §lll and
112.

Plaintiffs seek to circumvent the authorities cited by defendants and audaciously allege that
"Paragraphs 15, 16, 19, 22, 24, 26, 31, 34, 35, 36 and 46
(R. 63, 64, 65, 66 and 68) set up significant claims of
fraud,

breach of fiduciary duties and conversion . . .

[Plaintiffs' Brief, P. 43]

A review of the enumerated

paragraphs reveals that each and every allegation contained therein is made solely on information and belief.
Plaintiffs' novel, but unsupported premise, appears to
be that allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or
-

2 -
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conversion need only be asserted on information and
belief.

The law is clearly otherwise as is set forth in

Defendants' Brief at pages 5, 6, 7 and B.
Plaintiffs' reliance upon Stevens vs South Ogden
~~~~L-~~ll~l~~

(1896)

and Emp. Co., 14 Utah 232, 47 Pac. 81

is misplaced.

Stevens involved an action for the

appointment of a receiver for four related corporations.
Defendants filed a general demurrer to the Complaint which
the trial court sustained.

The plaintiffs failed to amend

their Complaint and the Court entered judgment dismissing
the action.

The issue on appeal was whether the Complaint

stated a cause of action, not whether a receiver should
have been appointed.

The issues relating to the minimum

evidentiary requirements necessary to support the appointment of a receiver were not before the Court.

Stevens

provides absolutely no assistance either by holding or by
analogy in resolving the issues presently before this
Court.
The remaining allegations upon which plaintiffs
rely are replete with unsupported legal conclusions
founded upon allegations made on information and belief.
A classic illustration is found in the Fifth Cause of
Action of the Complaint and Amended Complaint.
65)

(R. 64,

Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that the

defendant Arizona Fuels filed a "spurious claim" against
Major Oil in an Interpleader action pending in the United
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- digitization
3 Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

States District Court for the District of Otah.
para.

26)

(R.

64,

From the speculative premise that this claim

was "spurious," plaintiffs arrive at the legal conclusion
that the Onited States District Court's decision approving
the claim should be appealed.
It is clear

(R.

65, para. 27 and 28)

that every allegation of operative fact,

opinion and conclusion contained in the Fifth Cause of
Action is dependent upon the speculative premise that the
claim filed

by Arizona Fuels was "spurious."

Such a

conclusion clearly is neither evidence nor supported by
the record.
Plaintiffs' Tenth Cause of Action (R. 67,
68) suffers from the same acute frailties discussed above.
Paragraph 43 explicitly incorporates the information and
belief allegat1ons made throughout the Amended Complaint.
Paragraph 44 recites the theories and conclusions of eight
prior causes of action for relief as the basis for an
alternative claim founded upon fraud.

Each and every

allegation contained in Paragraph 44 is either explicitly
or

implicitly dependent upon allegations of operative

fact made on information and belief and, as such, cannot
conceivably support the appointment of a receiver.
Plaintiffs additionally have totally failed
to dentonstrate that the affiant, Wayne Weaver, is competent to testify as to the matters stated in the Complaint
and Amended Complaint.

Rule 56(e) of the Otah Rules of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- 4 provided
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Civil Procedure clearly requires that supporting affidavits shall "set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence and shall affirmatively show that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." An
affidavit which reveals no evidentiary fact but merely
reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and
conclusions does not comply with the standards set forth
in Rule 56(e).

Walker vs Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.,

29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973).
Neither the Verification, the Amended
Complaint nor the Complaint reveals any facts which
demonstrate that the affiant is competent to testify as to
the allegations relied upon by plaintiffs to support the
appointment of a receiver.

The Verification for the

Amended Complaint provides in its entirety:
"Wayne Weaver, being first duly
sworn, deposes and says that he is one
of the plaintiffs in the foregoing
action, that he has read the Amended
Complaint and understands the contents thereof and that the same
is true of his own knowledge except as
to matters therein stated on information and belief, and as to such
matters, he believes them to be
true."
(R. 72)
This Verification clearly does not demonstrate sufficient
evidentiary facts as required by Rule 56(e).
Defendants submit that the appointment of a
receiver for a corporation is not merely a routine function of the Court to be invoked by such generalized
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
- digitization
5 - provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

allegations as are contained in plaintiffs' Complaint and
Amended Complaint.

Rather,

it requires evidence of a

reliable nature which does not exist

in the present

case.
II.

PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS RELATING TO THE CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS MISCONCEIVE THE PROCEDURAL
POSTURE OF THE CASE.
Plaintiffs appear to entirely misconceive
the procedural posture of this case.

The question before

the Court arises on the plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification under Rule 23(c)(l) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
---------------

Moreover,

Rule 23(c)(l) explicitly

requires the Court to determine:

(a) whether this action

should be permitted to proceed as a class action (and, if
so,

as what particular type of a class action) or (b)

whether it should proceed as a shareholders' derivative
action,

if appropriate, or

(c) whether it should proceed

simply as an independent action by aggrieved individuals.
The authorities are unanimous on the duties and responsibilities of the Court when confronted with a Rule
23(c)(l) motion of this sort: to determine (i) whether the
action meets the criteria set forth for any class action
in Rule 23(a), and,

if so,

class action set forth

(ii) under which category of

in Rule 23(b)

the putative class

action is properly classified.

See: 7A Wright

&

~liller,

Federal Practice and Procedure,

§1785; 3B r1oore,

~1oore's

Federal Practice, para. 23.50.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As against this procedural background,
plaintiffs disingenuously argue that they have alleged "in
the alternative," that their action is, at one and the
same time, both a derivative suit and all three types of
class action specified in Rule 23(b).

Plaintiffs' Com-

plaint and Amended Complaint each contain allegations
which at least cursorily evoke the entire gamut of class
actions and derivative suits.

Moreover, there can be no

question but that Rule B(e)

permits pleading in the

alternative.
issue.

Yet all of this simply belies the real

A Rule 23(c)(l) motion requires the Court to

determine into which category of class actions,
the instant litigation falls.

if any,

When the question before

the Court is, as here, "under which of the four alternatives shall this action be classified," plaintiffs'
response that "we have alleged all four" is something of a
non sequitur.
In this connection, it should be observed
that the twelve

"causes of action"

set forth

in the

Complaint and Amended Complaint do not differentiate
between class claims and derivative claims.

Rather, four

divergent theories of action are alleged largely by rote
in the introductory seven paragraphs of the Complaint and
Amended Complaint and, consequently, appear to apply with
equal cogency to all twelve of the following "causes
of action."
- 7 -
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Doubtlessly,

a shareholder may possess

individual claims and simultaneously assert corporate
claims derivatively; however, this is not a case in which
a shareholder is suing on certain individual claims and
also on distinct corporate claims.

Quite the contrary, in

this case plaintiffs argue that each claim is "alternatively" all things to all men.

As a matter of "notice

pleading" this may be permissible but the issue presented
for

resolution on this motion is not "whether the Com-

plaint states a claim",
Complaint states."

but rather,

"what claim the

The answer to the former question is

obviously not dispositive of the latter inquiry, and it is
the latter inquiry only which is relevant here.
The resolution of that relevant and pressing issue--whether this is a class action at all and, if
so,

what kind--turns upon an analysis of the material

facts as they appear from the pleadings.
gainsaid and

is not disputed.

This cannot be

Defendants have never

contended that plaintiffs' Complaint was somehow insufficient on class certification issues, as distinguished
from

the

questions conserning the appointment of a

receiver,

because the allegations of operable facts

therein are asserted "on information and belief."

Plain-

tiffs are railing at chimeras when they assume the contrary and berate for arguments which they never advanced.
On the contrary, defendants' position is that, accepting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
- 8 - by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiffs' allegations at face value, they still state
exclusively

~Q££Q£~!~

claims,

which the plaintiffs'

may assert only derivatively, if at all.

That is to say,

even accepting all of the allegations of operable fact in
the plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint as true,
regardless of whether they are asserted on "information
and belief" or on personal knowledge, the fact remains
that they merely state corporate claims of Major Oil
Corporation.
On a Rule 23(c)(l) motion, an evaluation
of the substance of the plaintiffs' claims is perforce
necessary.

Plaintiffs' conclusory classification of these

claims by the largely verbatim recantation of the rubrics
of all three types of class actions under Rule 23(b) and
of shareholder derivative suits under Rule 23.1 in the
prefactory paragraphs of the Complaint augurs ill or not
at all for the reasoned disposition of the class certification motion.

The precise question before the Court in

this connection is one of substance and only tangentially of procedure, much less of proper notice pleading.
That plaintiffs can so blithely seek to rely on Rule 8(e)
and Rule 11, while studiously avoiding the thrust of Rule
23(c)(l) and Rule 23.1 altogether,

is nothing short of

incredible.
In addition, the authorities cited by the
plaintiffs are hardly dispositive of this issue.
-

9 -

A
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shareholder may have an individual claim against a corporation for breach of an actual or implied contract with
him,

~~·,

the unlawful declaration of a dividend, or for

a tortious act committed against him as in the failure to
disclose material
stock.

information to purchasers of

its

Claims against third parties, including corporate

insiders, who commit torts against the corporation or who
breach contracts with the corporation, are nonetheless
corporate causes of action and may be asserted by one or
more of the shareholders only derivatively for and on
behalf of the corporation.

Plaintiffs would be well

advised to review the quotation from the Advisory

(0m-

mittee Note to Revised Rule 23, set forth at page 38 of
their Brief and particularly the concluding parenthetical
statement thereof, before castigating the defendants for
their

reliance upon the plain meaning of the relevant

rules.
Finally, the Rule 23(c) (1) determination of
the nature of a class action has pervasive ramifications
for the future conduct of the litigation.

The incidents

and effects of the various types of class actions differ
depending upon the classification of Rule 23(b) into which
they fall.

Hence the leading commentators interpret the

mandate of Rule 23(c)(l) to require classification of an
action under subdivision (b) (1) or

(b) (2) whenever pos-

sible, precisely because of the added res judicata effect
- 10 -provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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accorded to the class opponent and the more efficacious
and expeditious procedures enjoyed by both parties and the
Court:
"If the court finds that a class action
could be maintained under (b){3), as
well as under {b)(l) and/or {b)(2),
the court should order that it be
maintained as a (b)(l) and/or (b)(2)
suit so that the members of the class
may not opt out as they would have a
right to do if the action were maintained as a (b)(3) class action." 3B
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, para.
23.50.
Even assuming arguendo that the allegations
set forth in the plaintiffs' Complaint may be properly
characterized as falling within the purview of both Rule
23(b)(l) and 23(b){3), this action should be certified to
proceed only under Rule 23(b){l), thereby assuring the
defendants of the final and binding adjudication to which
they are entitled.

In this connection, plaintiffs seem to

argue for some sort of "nondecision decision."
they moved the Lower Court for

Initially,

an order the precise

purpose of which was to determine whether the action
should proceed as a class action or not, and, in response
to defendants'

arguments that the action was not properly

classified as such,

they then curiously and somewhat

inconsistently revert to the position that it is, after
all,

alleged to be both and, therefore, the Court need

not, and indeed could not, decide the very question which
- 11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ultimately

constitutes

quintessence

of

their

motion!

While accusing defendants of being didactic in attempting
to analyze the substance of their allegations, plaintiffs
have the temerity to implicitly but completely eviscerate
Rule

23.1

purpose

or

without

even

even

the

to

addressing

themselves

separate existence

of

to

this

the
most

apposite rule.
Defendants

respectfully

submit that the

Lower Court erred certifying this action as a class action
when the only claims asserted by plaintiffs are corporate
claims of Major Oil Corporation.

This error

is compli-

cated by the fact that this action was certified as a
class action under both Rule 23(b) ( 1) and 23(b) (3), which
precludes tr.e res judicata effect of any judgment entered.
DATED

this 6th day of February, 1979.
/:
/'
/~'
//

LeRO

S. AXLAND, Esq.

DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER, AXLAND & ARHSTROl~G
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
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